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AIDS, THERAPEUTIC CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
WARNING THIRD PARTIES
DONALD H.J. HERMANN*
ROSALIND D. GAGLIANO**
I. INTRODUCTION: AIDS-MENTAL HEALTH AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has
been linked to myriad psychiatric disorders including depression,
paranoia, psychoses, dementia, and delirium.' Recent reports indi-
cate that the psychiatric consequences of HIV infection may occur
significantly earlier than overt physical signs of infection.2 The re-
sult is that otherwise asymptomatic patients may exhibit psychiatric
disorders.' Concomitant severe emotional disorders are likely to be
present in persons who know they are infected, without any other
psychiatric disorders being present. This clinical picture should not
be surprising in light of the devastating course of HIV-caused ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), the likely terminal na-
ture of the disease, and the stigma often associated with the illness'
widely publicized risk factors.4 Complicated cases of physical dis-
ease thus are fraught with sensitive issues affecting the treatment
and counseling mental health care professionals provide.
The need to meet the psychiatric and counseling needs of HIV-
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1. Holland & Tross, The Psychosocial and Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of the Acquired Immune
Deficiency and Related Disorders, 103 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 760, 761-62 (1985); Navia,
Jordan & Price, The AIDS Dementia Complex: Clinical Features, 19 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 517,
517-18, 522 (1986); Perry &Jacobsen, Neuropsychiatric Manifestations of AIDS-Spectrum Dis-
orders, 37 Hosp. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 135, 135-37 (1986).
2. Grant, Atkinson, Hesselink, Kennedy, Richman, Spector & McCutchan, Evidence
for Early Central Nervous System Involvement in the Acquired Immunodficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
and other Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infections, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 828,
835 (1987).
3. Id. ("[O]ur data suggests that persons with asymptomatic HIV infections may
have incipient central nervous system impairment.").
4. See, e.g., Morin, Charles & Malyon, The Psychological Impact of AIDS on Gay Men, 39
Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1288, 1289-90 (1984).
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infected persons is reflected in recent federal legislation.5 Title II of
the Health Omnibus Programs Extension Act of 19886 provides in
part for federal funding of demonstration projects to provide coun-
seling and mental health treatment for HIV-infected AIDS patients
experiencing serious psychological reactions caused by their
disease.'
Immediate and continuous collection of accurate information
on the medical condition of HIV-infected persons is vital to efforts
aimed at determining the spread of the disease, finding a cure, up-
dating treatment, and educating the public.' Superimposed on the
urgent need for data acquisition is the need to protect the privacy of
persons infected with HIV.9 The Presidential Commission on the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (the President's Com-
mission) reported that throughout its investigation of the spread of
HIV, it was confronted with discrimination against individuals who
are seropositive or at a more advanced stage of HIV infection.' 0 In-
dividuals at risk for HIV infection are concerned that a positive test
entry into their medical record or knowledge of their infectious sta-
tus may negatively affect their insurability, their employability, and
their ability to receive needed health care. " Current legislation in
all states mandates reporting diagnosed cases of AIDS; many stat-
utes, however, strictly limit disclosure to public health authorities. 2
Some states provide for contact tracing or partner notification,
which would permit state public health personnel to inform the
spouse or known past sexual partners of an AIDS-diagnosed pa-
tient."3 Most states, however, do not require the reporting of test
results of HIV-infected individuals who have not progressed to an
AIDS diagnosis. There is thus no authority in most states for public
5. S. 2889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 515,693 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1988).
6. Id. at S 15,697.
7. Id. at S 15,705.
8. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EP-
IDEMIC 2-3 (June 1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
9. Id. at 126-28.
10. Id. at 119-21.
11. Id. at 119.
12. See INST. OF MED. NAT'L AcAD. OF SCI., CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 14 (1987).
13. See Massachusetts Medical Soc'y, Partner Notification for Preventing Human Immu-
nodefuiency Viru (HIV) Infection--Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, Virginia, 37 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 393 (1988). In addition, two states-Georgia and Nebraska-
authorize state health department personnel to notify contacts of HIV-infected patients
in special cases, e.g., rape or incest. Id. at 393-94.
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health officials to contact the spouses or sexual partners of persons
who are only HIV-positive. Likewise, health care personnel or
counselors, including psychiatrists, psychologists, or psychiatric so-
cial workers, have no explicit authority to inform the spouse or
known sexual partner of the HIV status of a patient or client.' 4
Because the likelihood of transmitting HIV presumably in-
creases with the frequency of sexual encounters, 15 an uninformed
current sexual partner is a likely candidate for infection if safe sex
precautions, including barrier protections, are not utilized. There-
fore, the issue arises whether health care personnel or therapists
should have the discretionary authority to inform a.spouse, known
sexual partner, or intravenous (IV) needle-sharing partner of a pa-
tient's HIV status. The further question arises whether they should
have a duty to warn the patient's partner under any circumstances.
The relationship between therapist and patient is protected by a
rule of confidentiality which vests in the patient control over infor-
mation about the patient's health condition. 6 An increasing body
of case law and statutory provisions, however, have identified a ther-
apist's duty "to warn" or "to protect" the patient's intended victims
14. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 8, at 128.
15. Peterman & Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 256 J.
A.M.A. 2222, 2222 (1986) [hereinafter Peterman]. This presumption, as opposed to
certainty, underscores the incomplete nature of our medical knowledge. As the authors
note:
Though the risk groups for AIDS are well understood, little is known
about the absolute risk of acquiring infection through sexual contact. This risk
depends on two variables: the number of sexual contacts with an infected part-
ner and the likelihood of transmission of infection during sexual contact with
an infected partner .... If infection with the AIDS virus is like other sexually
transmissible infections, . . .the probability that transmission will occur in-
creases with the frequency of exposure.
Id. (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The problem is that we are not yet certain that
HIV infections are like other sexually transmissible infections.
16. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 709-11, 287 So. 2d 824, 830-32 (1973)
(citing privacy and implied contract principles); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros..
492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C. 1985) (holding that breach of obligation of confidentiality gives
rise to a tort). See also Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio 1965) (finding a contract between a patient and his physician and that "[als
an implied condition of that contract ... the doctor warrants that any confidential infor-
mation gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient's per-
mission.")
The patient's control, which is reflected in the physician's general duty of confiden-
tiality, is not necessarily absolute, however. See, e.g., Horne, 291 Ala. at 709, 287 So. 2d at
829 (physician's duty "is subject to exceptions prompted by the supervening interests of
society, as well as the private interests of the patient himself." (Emphasis added)). See
also infra text accompanying notes 32-46.
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from harm. 7
Many therapists who attempt to diminish the danger of further
transmission through HIV therapy or counseling may try to obtain a
patient's assurance that he or she will refrain from high-risk activi-
ties and will inform present or former sexual partners of the situa-
tion.' 8 When a patient refuses to inform a spouse, sexual partner,
or needle-sharing partner of his or her HIV infection, however, the
patient's therapist may have an ethical or legal duty to warn those
partners.' 9 Such action may directly conflict with traditional ethical
standards and statutes protecting confidentiality of the patient's
medical records.
This article examines the evolution of this conflict. The article
discusses state statutes 20 and proposed federal legislation' author-
izing an exception to the rule of confidentiality. The article then
focuses on potential effects of these laws upon the therapeutic rela-
tionship and therapists' authority to warn third parties. In addition,
the article examines reasons not to impose such a duty. Alternative
approaches are applied first to spouses, then to sexual partners or
IV needle-sharing partners who are identifiable and limited in
number. Finally, the article explores the desirability of providing
therapists or counselors with discretionary authority to warn
spouses or sexual partners, rather than fixing a mandatory duty to
warn.
17. For the seminal case holding such a duty exists under certain circumstances, see
Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 25 (1976), aff g in part, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974). For an article
illustrating Tarasoff's influence on, and unexpected benefits to, the treatment of a spe-
cific case, see Wulsin, Bursztajn & Gutheil, Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Deci-
sion: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn", 140 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 601 (1983)
[hereinafter Wulsin].
18. See Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS
Crisis, 259J. A.M.A. 1360, 1360 (1988).
19. Id. at 1360-61. For guidelines issued by the American Medical Association
(AMA), see infra text accompanying note 104.
20. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25 (West Supp. 1988) (permitting
disclosure by a physician to a spouse if the physician reasonably believes that the patient
will not make the disclosure).
21. H.R. 5142, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H7969 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1988). This bill passed the House on September 23, 1988, and went to Conference
Committee, where all provisions about confidentiality of test records and authorization
for spousal and other warnings were deleted. 134 CONG. REC. H10,251 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 1988). Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts has pledged to "make it a priority in the
[next] Congress to pass legislation that include(s] a reasonable and rational confidential-
ity standard for HIV counseling and testing." Id. at S15,690.
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II. THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
Obligatory confidentiality is a hallmark of the mental health
care profession.22 The American Psychiatric Association (APA) con-
siders confidentiality paramount to appropriate and effective treat-
ment due to the unique nature of mental health treatment. 3 A
patient will not speak freely with a therapist or counselor if public
disclosure is likely; effective treatment calls for true and complete
communication by the patient of his or her ideas and intentions.2 4
Maintaining privacy in this fashion also benefits society at large be-
cause it encourages individuals who need mental health treatment
to seek help without fearing public disclosure, humiliation, and
stigma.2 5  Similarly, in the AIDS information-gathering context,
where information about an individual's HIV status is important not
only for personal treatment, but also for public health, including ep-
idemiological studies, assured confidentiality is necessary to en-
courage voluntary participation of HIV-infected persons.26
The concept of confidentiality, which is based on the right to
privacy, recognizes that the decision to share personal information
rests with the patient. 27 A concomitant legal duty has arisen render-
22. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS 5-6
(1981 rev.) [hereinafter ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS]; NAT'L ASS'N OF SOCIAL
WORKERS, PROFESSION OF SOCIAL WORK: CODE OF ETHICS (1980), reprinted in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 951-56 (18th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SOCIAL WORKERS' CODE OF
ETHICS].
23. An American Psychiatric Association (APA) ethical principle states: "Because of
the sensitive and private nature of the information with which the psychiatrist deals, he
must be circumspect in the information that he chooses to disclose to others about a
patient." American Psychiatric Association, The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations
Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1058, 1063 (1973) [hereinafter
APA Pyinciples of Medical Ethics].
24. See Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecti-
cut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 733, 734 (1962). As the authors note,
Even under optimum conditions of confidentiality, it is difficult for the patient
to confide his thoughts and feelings to another person. If to that difficulty is
added the possibility of disclosure at some future date, it can be expected that
he will not speak freely and that his concern about the other implications of
treatment will be reinforced.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Beigler, Psychiatric Confidentiality and the American Legal System: An Ethical
Conflict, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 224 (S. Block & P. Chodoff ed. 1981).
26. See, e.g., Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control AIDS, 24 HARV.J.
ON LEGIS. 315, 325-27 (1987); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1274, 1280 (1986).
27. A New York court stated this point absolutely: "Every patient, and particularly
every patient undergoing psychoanalysis, has such a right to privacy." Doe v. Roe, 93
Misc. 2d 201, 213, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The Court further quoted
the California Supreme Court, which noted that "a large segment of the psychiatric pro-
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ing therapists liable in contract28 or in tort21 for breaches of pa-
tients' confidential communications made in the course of
treatment. As with most rules of law, however, the duty of confiden-
tiality is not absolute, and instances in which exceptions are war-
ranted have been identified.
III. THE DUTY TO WARN IN THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP
Exceptions to the therapist's duty to maintain patient confiden-
tiality are embodied in the principles of the APA:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to
him in the course of medical attendance or the deficiencies
he may observe in the character of the patient unless he is
required to do so by law, or unless it becomes necessary to protect
the welfare of the individual or community.30
Similar provisions occur in the professional codes of mental health
care workers, including those governing psychologists, social work-
ers, and psychiatric nurses."'
Court decisions from various jurisdictions have announced ex-
ceptions to the physician's duty of confidentiality. 2 Most cases have
determined that a therapist's duty to control a dangerous patient or
decrease the risk of harm to the patient or other persons outweighs
the confidential nature of the relationship. 3 The landmark case au-
thorizing a breach 'of confidentiality is the California Supreme
Court's decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.4
In Tarasoff the patient informed his therapist of his intention to kill
an unnamed person, readily identifiable as the girl with whom he
fession concurs... that an absolute privilege of confidentiality is essential to the practice
of psychotherapy .... In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 421, 467 P.2d 557, 560, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 832 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D.
Ohio 1965).
29. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
30. APA Principles ofMedical Ethics, supra note 23, at 1063.
31. See, e.g., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS. supra note 22, at 5; SOCIAL
WORKERS' CODE OF ETICS, supra note 22, at 954.
32. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920)
(physician held not liable for breach of confidentiality for warning patient's landlady of
his contagious disease).
33. See, e.g., Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Del. 1988) (a psychiatrist owes a
broad duty to exercise reasonable care in the treatment and discharge of mentally ill
patients to protect against reasonably foreseeable events).
34. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), affg in part, 529 P.2d
553. 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
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was infatuated. s5 Despite attempts by the therapist, his supervisors,
and the campus police to detain the patient in order to thwart any
act of violence, the patient murdered the young woman two months
later.3 6 The court analogized a therapist's duty to warn third parties
to a health care provider's liability for failure to control dangerous
patients. s7 The court then made a second analogy to a decision find-
ing that. a.physician has an obligation to warn a patient if the pa-
tient's condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as
driving, dangerous to others.3 8 The court held that "[a] physician
or a psychotherapist treating a mentally ill patient . . . bears a duty
to use reasonable care to give threatened parties such warnings as
are essential to avert foreseeable danger arising from his patient's
condition or treatment."3 9 The Tarasoff decision departed from ear-
lier cases that found liability for failure to control a patient or to
warn those who could control the patient.40 Instead, the court in
Tarasoff imposed upon the therapist a duty to warn the patient's in-
tended victim. 4 ' On rehearing the California Supreme Court refor-
mulated the obligation as one of a "duty of care" that could be
fulfilled by informing appropriate authorities of any threat by the
patient or by taking other measures to thwart an expressed act of
violence against an intended victim.4"
Courts increasingly are encountering the issue presented in the
Tarasoff decision.43 Judges are faced with the task of balancing the
patient's confidentiality interest against society's interest in protect-
ing the public from harm. When facing this dilemma and finding in
35. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
36. Id. at 432-33, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. The parents of the murdered
woman were the plaintiffs in the case. 17 Cal. 3d at 429, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 19.
37. 529 P.2d at 558, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citing Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67
Cal. 2d 465, 469, 432 P.2d 193, 196, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1967) (hospital has "rea-
sonable care" duty to prevent harm when it "has notice or knowledge of facts from
which it might reasonably be concluded that a patient would be likely to harm himself or
others .... )).
38. Id. (citing Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 465, 398 P.2d 14,
16, language amended per curiam, 401 P.2d 350, 350 (1965)).
39. Id. at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
40. See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding
mental hospital negligent for not giving information to court deciding dangerous pa-
tient's competency for release).
41. Tarasoff, 529 P.2d at 559. 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135. See generally Greenberg, The
Evolution of Tarasoff: Recent Developments in the Psychiatrist's Duties to Warn Potential Victims,
Protect the Public, and Predict Dangerousness, 12 J. PsYcHIAmRY & L. 315, 317 (1984).
42. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
43. See generally Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years After Tarasoff, 15
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 271 (1985).
62 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 48:55
favor of the societal interest,4 4 courts generally limit what is in-
cluded in the individual's interest in confidentiality. The scope of
the duty to warn, however, varies among jurisdictions addressing
the issue. Some courts narrowly define the duty and have inter-
preted Tarasoff as requiring a warning only when the intended victim
is specifically identifiable.45 Other courts recognize a duty to pro-
tect the general public even absent an identifiable victim when dan-
ger to others is foreseeable.4 6
Attempts to define the duty to warn have generated controversy
about when the duty arises and how it is to be discharged. 4' Tarasoff
represents the view that once a therapist actually determines, or rea-
sonably should have determined under applicable professional stan-
dards, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to another
person, the therapist has a duty to exercise reasonable care to pro-
44. See, e.g., Bellah v. Greenson, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92, 94-95 (1977), aff'd on reh'g, 81
Cal. App. 3d 614, 622, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539-40 (1978) (refusing to extend Tarasoff
liability to danger of self-inflicted harm or property damage). The court noted that
Tarasoff required a therapist to disclose confidential information if "the strong interest in
confidentiality [was] counterbalanced by an even stronger interest . .. (in] safety from
violent assault." 81 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The court recognized
that the therapeutic relationship would be compromised if therapists revealed a patient's
manifest suicidal tendencies. Id. Further, the need for confidentiality was not out-
weighed by the risk of suicide or property damage. Id. at 622, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
45. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 754, 614 P.2d 728, 735, 167
Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (1980) (duty to warn depends on and arises from existence of prior
threat to specific identifiable victim); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App.
474, 489, 454 A.2d 414, 421 (1983) (duty to warn and duty of reasonable care denied
when there is no identifiable victim).
46. See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980)
(applying Nebraska law and emphasizing the importance of foreseeability in defining the
scope of the duty to exercise due care); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 428-29, 671
P.2d 230, 237 (1983) (following Lipari approach); Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419
N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ind. App. 1981) (emphasizing need for "a knowledge of the likelihood
... [of] bodily harm before duty to warn exists). The duty to protect the general public
also was expressed by the dissent in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d at 759,
614 P.2d at 740, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Justice Tobriner au-
thored the majority opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,
551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), aff'g in part, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1974). Justice Tobriner, in Thompson, explained:
The principles underlying the Tarasoffdecision indicate .. . the existence of an
identifiable victim is not essential to the cause of action. Our [majority] deci-
sion rested upon the basic tenet of tort law that a "defendant owes a duty of
care to all persons who areforeseeably endangered by his conduct."
27 Cal. 3d at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (citation omitted; emphasis in
original). See generally Greenberg, supra note 4 1, at 324-30 (discussing and distinguishing
post-Tarasoff interpretive case law).
47. See, e.g., Quinn, The Impact of Tarasoff on Clinical Practice, 2 BEHAVORIAL SCI. & L.
319, 322 (1984) ("Both the imposition of a mandated positive duty on clinicians and the
specificity of that duty . . . caused an uproar in the professional community.").
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tect the foreseeable victim from that danger.48
The California Supreme Court followed the Tarasoff reasoning
in Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County,49 extending the thera-
pist's duty to protect third parties beyond the intended victim."
Evaluating foreseeability and determining whether a therapist
knows or should know requires to some degree that the therapist be
able to predict future behavior."' But such predictions cannot be
made with mathematical precision. Weighing expert testimony and
other evidence to determine whether the therapist knew or should
have known of the patient's dangerous propensity is a matter for the
finder of fact.
Establishing a professional standard of care for predicting fu-
ture dangerous behavior gives rise to distinct problems. Tradition-
ally, where schools of medical thought differ regarding reasonable
practice within a specialty, courts defer to the doctrines of the par-
ticular school the physician follows, if it is followed by a respected
segment of physicians in that specialty."2 The APA, representing a
significant segment of psychiatric practitioners, maintains that hold-
ing psychiatrists to a standard of care for predicting violent acts is
not reasonable." The APA contends that therapists do not possess
the skills to predict dangerousness reliably.' Some commentators
raise additional objections to imposing a duty to warn when treat-
ment is conducted on an outpatient basis, arguing that eliminating
48. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d, 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334, 345,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976), aff g in part, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), The
court stated the therapist's conduct would be measured against the traditional reason-
able care standard. Id.
49. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
50. Id. at 705-07, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. The court in Hedlund
relied upon Tarasoff's premise that the duty to warn arises when the therapist knew or
should have known of the patient's dangerousness, and reasoned that liability also may
exist for harm to others who would foreseeably be injured if the threats were to be
carried out. Id.
51. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. The
Tarasoff majority, relying upon a "reasonable care" standard, rejected the contention
that "imposition of a duty to protect third parties was unworkable because therapists
[could not) accurately predict whether or not a patient will resort to violence." Id.
52. W. PROSSER. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 32, at 187 (5th ed. 1984).
53. See Tarasof, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25 (ami-
cus argument). See generally Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 439 (1979) (discussing the difficulty of predicting violent behavior).
54. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25
(citing the APA's amicus argument stating that a therapist's ability to predict dangerous-
ness is too unreliable to be valid).
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the therapist's control obviates the duty requirement.5 5 Other com-
mentators state that the confusion surrounding the obligation and
the attendant liability forces therapists to breach confidentiality by
issuing warnings, even if the risk of harm is remote.58
A study conducted among California psychiatrists demon-
strated in both private and public practice that cases requiring a
Tarasoff warning often end in an alienated therapeutic alliance.57
Most of the therapists surveyed, however, viewed the duty to warn
as an ethical responsibility and stated that protecting life and
preventing violence serve a greater ethical good than preserving
confidentiality.58
In contrast, an earlier study concerning the clinical effects of
the duty to warn demonstrated a potential for harmony between the
warning required by Tarasoff and therapeutic confidentiality.5 9 This
case study suggested that successful alignment of the conflicting du-
ties may actually enhance therapy by bringing the potential victim
into the therapeutic process.' While recognizing the importance of
evaluating the perceived risk according to individual case circum-
stances, this study advocated directly informing the patient of the
intended breach of confidence. 6 The authors suggested reviewing
the breach with the patient in an open, inclusive and straightforward
manner similar to the process for obtaining informed consent. 2
Obtaining the patient's consent to the warning and exploring the
rationale for it allows the therapist a measure of external control,
emphasizing an intention to protect both victim and patient from
55. Note, Psychiatrists' Liability to Third Parties For Harmful Acts Committed By Dangerous
Patients, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1534, 1545 (1986).
56. See Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness. Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 508, 509 (1977).
57. Beck, Violent Patients and the Tarasoff Duty in Private Psychiatric Practice, 13 J. Psy-
CHIATRY & L. 361, 375 (1985).
58. Id. at 374. Less than 13% of the sample reported that they saw the duty as pri-
marily or entirely one of legal responsibility rather than one of ethical responsibility. Id.
59. Wulsin, supra note 17, at 601-02.
60. Id. at 602. The authors cite other advantages:
[T]he patient can identify with the therapist's deliberate (verbal) approach to
negotiating with the intended victim. .. [and) the approach ... may permit use
of a "less restrictive therapeutic setting," where the alliance functions in place
of an elaborate panoply of constraints and warnings to promote the patient's
ability to work therapeutically with people, including particularly the intended
victim.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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harm. 3 In one case the patient chose to issue the warning to the
intended victim over the telephone, in the presence of the thera-
pist. 4 As the authors stated:
The clinical context that gives rise to the issue of a
Tarasoff duty contains an inherent paradox; the patient
seems to act to thwart his own wishes. That is, the patient
who intends harm informs the therapist, who has-in the-
ory at least-some power to prevent that harm. The para-
dox of informing the therapist reflects the patient's fear of
his own aggressive wishes and his ambivalence toward ac-
tually harming the victim. Continuing the process of in-
forming the victim forces a graphic labeling of affects and
moves them ... back into the interpersonal context where
they developed; more importantly, the patient talks to the
intended victim instead of acting. If the warning is per-
formed with explicit recognition of the patient's ambiva-
lence about the intended harm, it allows the therapist to
ally with the healthy part of the patient's ego that fears the
assault.65
This analysis suggests that informing an identifiable victim of
the threat of violence made by a patient may not only protect the
patient and the potential victim, but also will contribute to a success-
ful therapeutic outcome.
IV. INFORMING THIRD PARTIES IN THE AIDS CONTEXT
In all states, there are statutes requiring that physicians, hospi-
tals, and laboratories report AIDS diagnoses to public health au-
thorities." The Centers for Disease Control and the National
Institutes of Health define reporting requirements to include the
subject's name and other personal information. One state, Colo-
rado, also requires the reporting of HIV infection as well as per-
sonal information about the subject.6 Others that require the
reporting of HIV infections, like Illinois, do not require personal
63. Wulsin, supra note 17, at 602.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-135 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.004 (Supp.
1988); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-I (Vernon Supp. 1988). See generally Cen-
ters for Disease Control, Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired lmmu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDrrY & MORTALTrrY WEEKLY REP. 3S (Supp. IS Aug. 14,
1987) (discussing the recently broadened definition of AIDS for purposes of reporting
AIDS cases to public health authorities).
67. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-4-1401 to -1410 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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data.68 Precedents for such reporting mandates are found in stat-
utes that require the reporting of other contagious diseases, includ-
ing sexually transmitted venereal diseases.6 9 The AIDS reporting
statutes that require disclosure to public health authorities generally
do not address the issue of the reporting therapist's or counselor's
duty to inform third parties that they have been exposed to HIV or
that they may be in danger of exposure. Case law suggests, how-
ever, that physicians may have a duty to warn family members of
danger posed to them by a family member diagnosed with a sexually
transmitted disease7 ° or with a contagious disease.7' Interestingly,
while all states have adopted legislation that requires reporting
AIDS-diagnosed patients, only a few states have enacted legislation
or adopted regulations providing for contact notification without
the express consent of the diagnosed person.7' A California statute
specifically provides immunity from prosecution for a physician dis-
closing a patient's HIV status to a third party believed to be the
patient's spouse."
Illinois law provides for notification of both parties to an in-
tended marriage in the event that either tests positive for HIV in a
test administered pursuant to obtaining a marriage license.74 On
the other hand, the Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act 75 appears to
prohibit physicians from warning third parties without the patient's
68. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 1-1/2, para. 7404 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
69. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-402 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-7 (West
1964 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 201 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988). See
generally F. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 16-17 (1975).
70. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (syphilis).
The "family member" in this case was the patient's landlady, whom the doctor warned
because the disease was in a stage where it could be spread by casual contact. Id.
71. See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984) (recogniz-
ing the duty but declining to apply it under the facts of this hepatitis case); Davis v.
Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 391, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921) (typhus); State v. Wordin, 56
Conn. 216, 229, 14 A. 801, 804 (1887) (diphtheria); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d
752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (tuberculosis); Shepard v. Redford Community
Hosp., 151 Mich. App. 242, 246, 390 N.W.2d 239, 241 (1986) (meningitis); Skillings v.
Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 326, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (1919) (scarlet fever); Jones v. Stanko,
118 Ohio St. 147, 147, 160 N.E. 456, 457 (1928) (smallpox).
72. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25 (West Supp. 1988); TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.03(b)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988); 1988 S.C. ACTs 508;
1988 N.Y. LAws 584. In addition, Maryland and Oregon have policies requiring physi-
cians or state officials to notify persons known to be at risk, if the patient refuses to tell
the persons voluntarily. INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POL. PROJECT, GEORGE WASHING-
TON UNIv., I AIDS: A PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE 4-17 (1987).
73. The provision is permissive and may be interpreted to apply solely to the attend-
ing or diagnosing physician. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25 (West Supp. 1988).
74. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
75. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, paras. 7301-7358 (Smith.Hurd Supp. 1988).
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consent.7 6 Other statutory provisions permit the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Health to engage in contact tracing of diagnosed
AIDS patients, but do not require reporting the names of HIV-in-
fected patients." In addition, no provision is made for contacting
past or present sexual or needle-sharing partners of persons who
are HIV-infected if the seropositive individual has not actually re-
ceived an AIDS diagnosis.
Texas authorizes disclosure to the spouse of a person who tests
positive for HIV. 78  Confidentiality provisions were recently
amended in Wisconsin to authorize disclosure to persons known to
be needle-sharing contacts or sexual partners of a deceased individ-
ual who had been diagnosed with AIDS. 79 The New York legisla-
ture recently enacted a statute authorizing physicians to warn the
sexual or needle-sharing partners of AIDS patients of potential ex-
posure without consent, despite the patient's objections, where the
physician reasonably believes the patient will not make the
disclosures.8
0
While hardly establishing a trend, these enactments demon-
strate legislative recognition of the dilemma physicians face and rep-
resent tentative steps toward its resolution. The United States
Congress recognizes the problem as well. The House of Represent-
atives addressed it in a bill entitled the AIDS Federal Policy Act of
1988.8" This legislation included confidentiality provisions 2 and
granted authority to inform spouses, as well as sexual and needle-
sharing partners, of the status of HIV-infected persons.8 3 Although
the provisions of this bill were excluded from the AIDS legislation
that the 100th Congress eventually passed, 4 the House bill pro-
vides a model approach to the problem of how to handle the poten-
tial risk to third parties. Included in the bill were provisions for a
grant program and confidentiality protections for AIDS counseling
76. Id. at para. 7357.
77. See Illinois Sexually Transmissible Disease Control Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I I I-
1/2, paras. 7401, 7405 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
78. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.03(b)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (per-
missive authorization to disclose; no duty to disclose).
79. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(5)(a)(14) (West Supp. 1988).
80. Act of Sept. 1, 1988, ch. 584, § 2782(4)(A), 1988 N.Y. Laws (WESTLAW, NY-
LEGIS database) (to be codified at N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2782(4)(A)). This law, how-
ever, forbids the physician from disclosing the identity of the patient. Id.
81. H.R. 5142, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H8076 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1988).
82. d. passim.
83. Id. at § 2329, 134 CONG. REC. at H8081.
84. 134 CONG. REC. S 15,693 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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and testing."5 The bill conditioned receipt of federal funds on state
compliance with specific requirements, including those for report-
ing and contact tracing. 6 The bill also provided that a physician or
counselor could disclose identifying information about a person
who tested positive for HIV if the disclosure were made to the
tested person's spouse, sexual partner, or needle-sharing partner; if
the physician or counselor were to reasonably believe that the tested
person would not voluntarily inform those at risk; and if the disclo-
sure were medically appropriate.8 7
Permissive statutes authorizing disclosure to a spouse or known
sexual partners do not facially create a legal duty to warn. Physi-
cians believing that the duty to warn in this context is ethical in ori-
gin may derive reassurance from such enactments. In the absence of
clear legal authority allowing physicians to make such disclosures,
the issue will remain one in which physicians who choose to make
warnings do so at their own legal risk.
The case of the recalcitrant AIDS patient is not purely conjec-
ture. One physician relates an experience in which an HIV-positive
patient, consumed with anger over his diagnosis, announced his in-
tention to have sexual relations with other people to infect as many
as possible."8 In another case a gynecologist became unexpectedly
involved in an ethical situation that began when a patient informed
him that her son was bisexual.8 9 The physician knew the son was at
risk for HIV infection and also knew that the young man was en-
gaged to one of the physician's female patients.90 The physician
elected not to inform the other patient and later fell subject to the
patient's rage and indignation for failure to disclose the danger to
her.9  In another case Rock Hudson's former sexual partner
brought suit against two physicians involved in Hudson's care, alleg-
ing that they conspired to prevent him from discovering Hudson's
disease and condition.92
Earlier cases involved a physician's duty to warn a patient's fain-
85. H.R. 5142, § 2302, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H8077 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1988).
86. Id. at § 2308, 134 CONG. Rac. at H8078.
87. Id. at § 2329, 134 CONG. REC. at H808 1.
88. Howe, Ethical Problems in Treating Military Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Diseases, 3 J. CoNTEMp. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 111, 143 n. 131 (1987) [hereinafter Howe].
89. Greenfield, A Gynecological Dilemma Involving AIDS, 2 CLINICAL PRAC. SEXUAITrrY 30
(1985); Howe, supra note 88, at 139 n.117.
90. Greenfield, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Gomey, The New Laws of Love: The Courts, Sexually Contracted Diseases and a Partner's
Right to Know, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1985, at C-1, col. 2; Howe, supra note 88, at 139.
[VOL. 48:55
1989] CONFIDENTIALITY AND WARNING THIRD PARTIES 69
ily or member of the household of the danger presented by a pa-
tient's contagious disease.9" These cases did not reach the question
of a physician's responsibility to warn third parties at risk where a
competent adult patient, after full counseling, had already agreed to
make the disclosure.
Although physicians have been held liable for a breach of the
duty to warn in the various contexts already identified, it is unclear
whether the holdings in such cases extend to situations involving
HIV infection. Duty to warn cases have generally involved psychia-
trists who have failed to take steps to protect clearly identified third
parties from a dangerous act of a patient.94 In the infectious disease
context, liability has been imposed when neither the patient nor the
third party was advised of the risk that the patient's condition posed
to the third party.95 Existing case law would have to be extended to
impose on a health care provider a duty of disclosure where a com-
petent, fully informed patient, who had agreed after competent
counseling to make his or her own disclosure, failed to do so. Im-
posing such a duty may deter therapists from making specific inquir-
ies about the sexual and needle-sharing activities of a patient if
doing so would create legal liability for failing to use information
obtained to warn involved persons.
V. HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF THERAPIST FAILING TO
INFORM SPOUSE OF HIV-INFECTED PATIENT
Whether a therapist has the responsibility to notify individuals
at risk for HIV was recently the subject for debate between attorneys
from two California law firms.96 The debate was based upon a hy-
pothetical fact situation involving a married, forty-one-year-old man
whose lucrative, but stressful, professional life prompted him to
93. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(tuberculosis); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920)
(landlady informed that boarder was in infectious state of syphilis).
94. The landmark case is Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), aff'g in part, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974),
in which the victim was clearly identifiable. But see also Thompson v. County of Alameda,
27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980) (Tobriner, J., dissenting), dis-
cussed supra note 46.
95. See, e.g., Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 746-47, 183
N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (finding liability when employer failed to advise
employee or employee's wife of employee's X-ray results showing presence of
tuberculosis).
96. Girardi, Keese, Traver & Cooksey, Featured Debate: Psychotherapist Responsibility in
Notifying Individuals at Risk for Exposure to HIV, 25 J. SEx REs. 1 (1988) [hereinafter
Girardi].
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
enter psychotherapy. During the second year of therapy, the patient
had a homosexual affair, which he disclosed to the therapist. The
patient firmly refused to follow the therapist's repeated suggestion
that he inform his wife of the affair. He persisted in his refusal even
after testing positive to the HIV antibody, which he also refused to
disclose to his wife. A few years later, the patient was diagnosed
with AIDS, but still adamantly refused to disclose his illness to his
wife. The wife finally received the information from an anonymous
telephone caller. When she confronted her husband, he refused to
discuss the matter with anyone other than the therapist. She then
obtained an HIV test, which found her to be seropositive. She sued
the therapist for negligence in failing to warn her of a "serious
threat of danger" posed by her husband's disease.
The attorney-teams were assigned representative roles and
asked to submit arguments and rebuttal appropriate to their respec-
tive roles, as if the case were being heard before a jury in a Califor-
nia court. Counsel for the plaintiff wife emphasized that the
therapist's failure to disclose conflicted with the paramount duty to
promote the general health of society. Upholding patient confidenti-
ality in this context was tantamount to permitting the plaintiff "to
walk blindly into an absolutely undetectable 'ambush.'""' The
plaintiff's counsel contended that the danger posed by AIDS is
equivalent to the threat of physical violence, long relied upon by
courts as triggering the duty to warn.
Defense counsel argued that the patient's failure to inform his
wife that he had AIDS was not the violent act contemplated in
Tarasoff. Further, despite continued routine sexual intercourse be-
tween the plaintiff and her husband, the defendant contended that
his wife was not "clearly" in danger of contracting AIDS. The de-
fense dismissed the fact of the plaintiff's seropositivity as not pro-
viding clear evidence that the wife would develop AIDS. According
to the defense, science has not shown that all seropositive individu-
als will develop AIDS.
The defense argument implied that the danger posed by the
patient may be plotted in degrees, and that continuing sexual rela-
tions with a spouse who has no reason to believe he or she is at risk
does not rise to the degree of dangerousness requiring a warning
because it cannot be shown with medical certainty that he or she will
develop AIDS and die. One study notes that "[s]ince infection is
transmitted to only about 10% to 50% of steady heterosexual part-
97. d. at 8.
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ners, the likelihood of transmission to a partner with a single expo-
sure must be quite low, probably less than 1 7 per contact. "98
Nevertheless, it is clear that repeated contacts increase the like-
lihood of infection. Moreover, the uninformed partner who does
become infected also may become pregnant and deliver an infected
infant. Or a surviving spouse may remarry following the spouse's
death, the true nature of the death having been kept confidential. If
the new spouse becomes HIV-positive following repeated exposure,
he or she too may have a cause of action as a foreseeable victim of
the physician's failure to take necessary protective action. More-
over, seropositive but asymptomatic children produced from the
marriage may "carry" the virus into the next generation. It can be
argued that even the remote risk of such situations mandates warn-
ing an unsuspecting spouse, and is consistent with protecting and
promoting the general welfare of society. Thus, merely the poten-
tial for development of full-blown AIDS following transmission of
the virus should be the principal criterion for determining whether a
duty to warn should be imposed upon a physician.
Defense counsel in the debate distinguished Tarasoff, where the
danger posed was based on the patient's mental condition, from the
hypothetical case involving the patient's physical condition. Coun-
sel for the plaintiff, however, argued that the patient's persistent re-
fusal to inform the spouse, despite the patient's knowledge of the
consequences of HIV infection, should be regarded as sufficient to
demonstrate to a therapist that the patient's mental or emotional
condition posed a definite danger to the spouse. The argument is
not without support. One commentator, for example, has sug-
gested that "from a psychiatric perspective, the assertion that a pa-
tient with HIV who wants to infect others has an underlying mental
illness is credible." 99
VI. RESERVATIONS ABOUT IMPOSING A DUTY TO WARN
Hesitancy about imposing a duty to warn has been multifaceted.
There is concern that patients may be less forthcoming if they do
not retain control over who is informed about their HIV status. In
addition, there is concern that therapists may be reluctant to ex-
plore the possible danger to third parties with the patient if such an
98. See generally Peterman, supra note 15. at 2224 (discussing the likelihood of trans-
mission through repeated exposure, and consequences of heterosexual promiscuity); see
also Howe, supra note 88, at 137 & n.101.
99. Howe, supra note 88, at 146 & n. 144 (discussing involuntary hospitalization of
promiscuous individuals with HIV as a means of protecting others).
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exploration may lead to therapists' legal liability for failure to warn
the third party. This hesitancy has led to the suggestion that merely
threatening to warn the spouse or known sexual partners may stimu-
late the patient into appropriate action while helping him or her
overcome the denial often associated with HIV-related diagnoses.'t°
A therapist's threat to inform the third party would leave control in
the patient to the extent that he or she could choose to inform the
third party. At least such an approach would eliminate patient fear
that others were being informed of the patient's HIV status without
the patient's knowledge.
Others who are reluctant to impose a duty to warn have been
inclined to recognize an authority to warn in the appropriate cir-
cumstances. This approach would permit a physician or public
health official limited disclosures to a patient's spouse or known sex-
ual partner, especially where spouses or heterosexual partners are
involved since they are unsuspecting and therefore unlikely to as-
sume the precautions taken by members of high risk groups.'°' Giv-
ing physicians this authority without exposing them to legal liability
would eliminate physician reluctance to explore with the patient any
danger of transmission to third parties.
Some who favor a duty to warn would place that obligation on
public health authorities, who have general authority for contact
tracing in sexually transmissible and communicable diseases, some
of whom have been given explicit authority to perform contact trac-
ing in the HIV context. 0 2 The rationale of the latter, least-intrusive
approach is that it would afford protection to the greatest number of
individuals without affecting therapist-patient confidentiality.
The American Medical Association (AMA) has endorsed reli-
ance on the physician as a last-resort source of warning to endan-
gered third parties.'10 3 In its most recent report, the AMA Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs adopted the following guidelines to
aid physicians encountering the duty to warn dilemma:
100. Id. at 141 & n. 123 (citing Perry & Markowitz, Psychiatric Interventions for AIDS-
Spectrum Disorders, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1005 (1986)).
101. Echenberg, A New Strategy To Prevent the Spread of AIDS Among HeteroseuaLs, 254 J.
A.M.A. 2129, 2129 (1985); Mills, Wofsy & Mills, Special Report: The Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 314 Nzw ENG.J. MED. 931, 932 (1986) [hereinafter Mills], Research
into the statistics of the heterosexual AIDS epidemic indicate that by 1991, the percent-
age of women who suffer from AIDS will rise to at least 9% of the total AIDS popula-
tion. Discounting the number of women drug abusers, the predicted rise in percentage
is attributed to sexual partnership with an infected person. Osborn, AIDS: Politics and
Science, 318 NEw ENG. J. MFD. 444, 446 (1988).
102. Mills, supra note 101, at 933.
103. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, supra note 18, at 1361.
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Where there is no statute that mandates or prohibits the
reporting of seropositive individuals to public health au-
thorities and a physician knows that a seropositive individ-
ual is endangering a third party, the physician should
(1) attempt to persuade the infected patient to cease en-
dangering the third party; (2) if persuasion fails, notify au-
thorities; and (3) if the authorities take no action, notify the
endangered third party.' 0 4
VII. DUTY TO WARN VERSUS AUTHORITY TO WARN
During debate of one proposed piece of AIDS legislation, the
AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1988,'05 the House of Representatives
considered the alternatives of a mandatory duty to warn as opposed
to a permissive authority to warn. An amendment to the House bill
was offered" °6 which would have required states receiving federal
funds under the proposed act to compel physicians diagnosing an
HIV-infected patient to "make reasonable efforts" to disclose the
fact of infection to the patient's spouse.'0 7 Further, a counselor or
therapist learning that a client is HIV-infected would be required to
"make reasonable efforts" to disclose that fact to the patient's
spouse.' °s The physician would be required first to permit the pa-
tient to make the initial disclosure to the spouse; 10 9 then, notwith-
standing such disclosure, the physician or counselor would also be
required to disclose the information." 0 The amendment required
implementation of a state enforcement mechanism, but provided
that "[no] physician or counselor may be sued or held liable by any
private person for the failure to make an effort to notify any
individual." I "
Opponents of this legislation cited the opposition of the AMA
and the National Governors' Association." 2  The opposition's
104. Id.
105. H.R. 5142, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H7969 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1988). The bill passed the House, see supra note 21, but was not included in the com-
prehensive federal health legislation enacted into law in November 1988. See Health
Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3048 (1988). See
also 134 CONG. REC. S15,690 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
106. 134 CONG. REC. H8073-74 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1988) (amendment proposed by
Rep. McCollum).
107. Id. at H8073.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 134 CONG. REC. at H8073-74.
Ill. Id. at H8074 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (statement of Rep. Waxman).
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thrust was that decisions about medical practice should be left to the
discretion of medical practitioners, and decisions about regulating
medical practice should be best left to the states.113
Other opponents stressed the necessary vagueness and impreci-
sion of any duty to warn statute and objected on two bases: first, the
difficulty in specifying the nature of a reasonable effort to identify a
spouse and to inform; and second, the inability to establish a uni-
form and appropriate penalty for noncompliance." 4 The vote
against this proposal was 279 to 105, with 47 not voting." 5
The House bill as originally proposed and adopted included a
provision for nonconsensual, discretionary disclosure to third par-
ties."' It allowed a therapist, counselor, or physician under speci-
fied conditions to disclose information about a patient's HIV status
to the patient's spouse or to an individual the patient had identified
as a sexual or needle-sharing partner. 1 7 The specified conditions
were that the patient had been counseled about making medically
appropriate disclosures of appropriate information to the respective
third parties, that the counselor or physician believed that the pa-
tient would not inform the third parties, and that the disclosure and
its extent was medically appropriate.'" The Senate bill to amend
the Public Health Service Act' with the House bill as an amend-
ment passed the House 367 to 13, with 51 not voting.'2 0 It was not,
however, incorporated into the omnibus public health bill that Con-
gress eventually passed.
Granting physicians the authority to inform third parties under
the conditions specified by the House bill would provide a means
for disclosing to third parties medically relevant information in ap-
propriate circumstances. Providing such authority without impos-
ing a duty to warn avoids the counter-productive impact of a duty to
warn, which would result in liability for physicians and therapists
who fail to comply with the law. Such potential liability may influ-
ence a therapist or physician to avoid inquiring into possible dan-
gers to third parties.
The compromise to patient confidentiality, however, is not fully
113. Id.
114. 134 CONG. REC. at H8074 (statement of Rep. Madigan).
115. Id. at H8075.
116. H.R. 5142, 100th Cong.. 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H8076, H8081 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1988).
i17. Id.
118. Id.
119. 134 CoNG. REC. H8076 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1988).
120. See supra note 105.
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addressed by this type of legislation. This defect can best be cor-
rected by physicians and therapists informing patients at the outset
of treatment that one area of inquiry will be the possible danger of
* HIV transmission. At that time, the patient should be told it may be
necessary for the patient to inform his or her spouse, sexual part-
ners, or needle-sharing partners to prevent infection, and that if the
patient fails to inform such persons, it is the obligation of the physi-
cian or therapist to do so. Such informed consent protects patient
autonomy and provides continuing support for the physician-pa-
tient relationship should the issue of third-party protection arise.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Establishing in a vacuum a duty to warn third parties of the po-
tential of HIV infection will not resolve the dilemma posed by the
need for confidentiality and the need to protect third parties in the
context of HIV infection. The problem of when and under what
circumstances a warning should be given poses great difficulty, both
in terms of specifying the circumstances under which the duty arises
and in fixing an appropriate remedy or penalty for failure to comply.
For instance, will a therapist whose patient admits to continued
high-risk behavior, but refuses to submit to an HIV antibody test, be
required to notify the patient's spouse or known sexual partner that
the patient or client may have been exposed to HIV? Will the duty
unreasonably burden the therapist with obligations to become a
sub-specialist in acquired immunodeficiency disorders?' 2 ' For the
mental health therapist, the disruptive influence the breach may
have upon the therapist-patient therapeutic relationship also must
factor into the decision. In the absence of explicit statutory authori-
zation for disclosures, physicians must balance the interests affected
in such situations against the very real possibility of legal liability for
breaches of confidentiality.
In the mental health context, shifting the burden of notification
to public health authorities to resolve the dilemma of duty to third
parties presents several problems. At present most public health
authorities having notification authority have such authority only in
cases of actual AIDS diagnoses. Such authority does not extend to
those patients who are still in the earlier, HIV infection stage of the
syndrome. By its official nature, state contact tracing is likely to in-
tensify the emotional distress of the person who is informed of pos-
121. See generally Girardi, supra note 96, at 26-27 (demonstrating the onerousness of
imposing a general duty to warn in this context).
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sible HIV exposure. Including the patient or client in the discussion
with the spouse or with the sexual or needle-sharing partner pro-
vides a therapeutic forum better suited to dealing effectively with
the gravity of the situation, especially if th'ere will be continuing con-
tact between the patient and the spouse or the sexual or needle-
sharing partner. Therapists are better suited than public officials to
intervene, counsel, and facilitate toward positive behavior in such
crises.
Additional problems of follow-up and patient confidentiality
compound the issue. 'It is doubtful that the ethical therapist 1will
deem his or her duty fulfilled by merely notifying public health au-
thorities. The physician or therapist may be motivated by con-
science to seek some mechanism to determine whether or not the
individual who may have been infected has indeed been notified by
the patient or by the public health authority. Therapists also will
require reassurance that the names of potentially infected persons
reported to authorities receive the protection necessary to maintain
the degree of confidentiality to which the persons potentially ex-
posed, as well as patients, are equally entitled.
Until legislation addressing these vital issues is promulgated,
therapists facing the dilemma must depend on their ethical con-
sciences to determine which course of action to follow. In many in-
stances the therapist may be forced to choose between a potential
rupture of the therapeutic alliance with the patient and the possible
prevention of disease transmission to other persons, which might
not only help the third party but also contribute in a small way to
halting the epidemic. In the absence of a workable, implemented
authority to warn third parties in danger of HIV infection, spouses
and other sexual or needle-sharing partners of infected persons who
refuse to confirm their disease or conform their behavior remain un-
wittingly at the mercy of therapists and physicians. These health
care providers, who after all are only human and fallible, may or
may not choose to risk legal liability to further their ethical sense of
obligation to protect third parties.
[VOL. 48:55
